1. 研究目的与意义（文献综述包含参考文献）
The People's Republic of China and Kazakhstan have always attached great importance to the economic and trade cooperation between them. In July 1991, during the visit of Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic President to China, he demonstrated the interest of Kazakhstan in the establishment of independent good-neighborly relations with China, primarily in the economic sphere, as well as in maintaining political contacts with the Chinese leadership. In particular, it is worth emphasizing that Xi Jinping, the President of People's Republic of China, put forward "the Silk Road Economic Belt" initiative for the first time, in his speech in Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan on Sep.7, 2013, which fully proves that China attaches great importance to Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan actively responds to "the Silk Road Economic Belt" initiative, actively participates in the construction of "the Belt and Road", and benefits from the Belt and Road, and the trade with China. Therefore, it is necessary to make an in-depth study on how does trade with China promote Kazakhstans economy. Generally, the related research consists of the following aspects.Research backgroundThe research focused on the history and current situation of Sino- Kazakhstan Trade.Peyrouse (2008) argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 enabled the states of Central Asia to rediscover their Chinese neighbor. In less than two decades, Beijing has taken advantage of the disappearance of its Soviet neighbor to launch its program of development of the Great West and open Xinjiang to border nations, while the states of Central Asia, seeking new partners, have sought to benefit from Chinas dynamism by integrating them-selves into the Asia-Pacific zone of prosperity. While the Chinese authorities may make a point of honor in establishing cordial relations with the five states of the region, Kazakhstan enjoys a particular status: indeed, the China-Kazakhstan partnership is termed strategic, the highest of diplomatic epithets, confirming Astana as a major political ally of Beijing in a post-Soviet climate in which the Kazakh government is displaying balanced and diversified policies in the face of Moscows heavy-handed presence. This privileged China-Kazakhstan partnership is based on a multifaceted economic reality. These days, China Kazakhstan trade represents more than two-thirds (about 70 percent) of all China-Central Asia trade. [1]Clarke (2014) mentioned that Official SinoKazakh bilateral ties reached new heights dur-ing Chinese President Hu Jintaos official visit to Astana in June 2011 when he, and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, signed a joint declaration announcing their countrys inten-tions to develop an all-round strategic partnership. In the same article Ping (2011) men-tioned that this declaration means that the SinoKazakh relationship is the only SinoCentral Asian relationship to have achieved this status in the Chinese diplomatic lexicon. This all round strategic partnership would be achieved by striving to deepen pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperation and strengthen coordination in a bid to realize common de-velopment and prosperity. The SinoKazakh bilateral relationship has in fact deepened considerably in economic and political/security terms since the establishment of official ties after the collapse of the Soviet Union. [2]Dr. Paramanov (2005) mentioned that in 2003, trade between China and Kazakhstan amount-ed to 2.856 billion dollars, a growth of 13% over the previous year (approximately 13.6% of Kazakh and 0.35% of Chinese trade). The volume of Kazakh exports to China amounted to 1.31 billion dollars (10.3% of Kazakhstans exports and 0.33% of Chinas imports), whereas Chinese exports to Kazakhstan were approximately 1.546 billion dollars (18.4% of Kazakh-stans imports and 0.35% of Chinas exports). Over 80% of Kazakhstans exports to China were attributable to raw materials (sources of energy 58%, ferrous and non-ferrous metals 24%). The range of goods exported from China included engineering and metalworking pro-duction (approximately 69%), foodstuffs (approximately 9%) and other goods. The official statistics of Kazakhstan generally fail to consider the volume of the so-called shuttle trade. The Kazakh Customs Committee estimate that the Sino-Kazakh shuttle trade, at approxi-mately 2-3.5 billion dollars, is comparable in scale to the official bilateral trade. This ex-plains to a large extent the differences in the figures of international organizations and statis-tical organizations in Kazakhstan and China in respect of the real volume of Sino-Kazakh trade.[3]Altynsarina (2019) argued that now Kazakhstan and China are at a new stage in their state development; we will see national revival and deepening of interstate relations.An im-portant conclusion is that Kazakhstan and China maintain full mutual understanding and re-spect, largely adhere to similar approaches, and share positions on issues on the international and regional agendas. Kazakhstan and China also highly appreciate each others current achievements and support the aspirations of both countries to move to a new level of political and economic development. It is important that both countries see each other as reliable part-ners, a source of profitable opportunities and jointly work to achieve even greater results. It is this approach that will give rise to synergy. [4]The research focused on the comparative advantages and major export commodities of Kazakhstan and China in bilateral trade. Peyrouse (2008) argued that the Several bilateral committees have been created to encourage trade. The main one is the China-Kazakhstan Cooperation Committee, established in 2004 and led by the Chinese and Kazakh Prime Ministers. It comprises around a dozen specialist sub-committees, for example on finance, biotechnology, petroleum and gas, and the use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. For Kazakhstan, the future of economic relations with China is bilateral. Located in the Aktobe region, it controls almost 15 percent of Kazakh pe-troleum, and holds a 20-year license for exploitation of the Zhanazhol and Kenkiyak petrole-um and gas sites, which represent 5 percent of Kazakhstans total petroleum reserves. A pro-posed oil pipeline connecting Kazakhstan and China had been considered as early as 1997 but only became a reality in 2003.China finally confirmed its status as a major partner in the Kazakh energy market in 2003 with the commissioning of the Atasu Alashakou pipeline, the acquisition of new oil and gas fields, and the arrival on the Kazakh scene of Chinese compa-nies other than CNPC. [1]Kudrenok (2019) mentioned that as for bilateral economic cooperation, nowadays it is char-acterized by positive dynamics, covering transit and transport infrastructure, trade, manufac-turing, financial and energy sectors, engineering, and other important spheres. In addition to acquiring oil and gas fields, China is investing in the pipelines that enable it to secure its sup-plies, even though production at some sites acquired by Beijing in the west of Kazakhstan is exported to Europe via the Russian pipelines and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). [5]O'Neill (2014) talks about two important advantages for many Chinese firms investing in Ka-zakhstan: the nature of firm ownership and the funding supporting these investments. Nearly all major investments by Chinese firms in Kazakhstan are by state-owned enterprises. Large state-owned firms should be at an advantage in corrupt and risky investment environments. The size of the investment and the ownership type both indicate the involvement in the in-vestment agreement of political elites on both sides. Because such investments are as much a part of bilateral political relations as they are economic ties, both governments have a stake in their success. Nearly all major investments by Chinese firms in Kazakhstan are by state-owned enterprises. Large state-owned firms should be at an advantage in corrupt and risky investment environments. The size of the investment and the ownership type both indicate the involvement in the investment agreement of political elites on both sides. Because such investments are as much a part of bilateral political relations as they are economic ties, both governments have a stake in their success. The second key advantage for Chinese state-owned firms investing abroad is financial support from the Chinese government. It is a char-acteristic of this funding that makes it so potent as a foreign economic policy tool: unlike much Western financial assistance, Chinese aid and loans come without strings attached for political or economic reform; they thus enhance rather than threaten the survival of the lead-ership in the receiving state. The trade opportunity brought by the difference of factor en-dowment between the two countries was verified by comparing the differences between im-port and export products of the two countries. [6]At the same article ONeill (2014) mentioned support by the Chinese government for invest-ments by Chinas state-owned enterprises in Kazakhstan is a straightforward example of how foreign investments can be approved and secured, at least in the short-term, where rule of law is weak, and corruption is high: the protection of the key players can be bought. Chinese oil companies engaging in bribery to secure approval of deals are not unique; they are playing a game whose rules were written by major Western oil companies long ago.[6]Morduch (2016) mentioned that Kazakhstan is open to international trade. According to the World 20 Bank, the share of international trade in 2018 amounted to 62.8% of GDP. Kazakh-stan's main export products are raw materials, notably oil, petroleum products, coal, iron ore, machinery. Cereals, wool and meat are other major exports. The country imports mainly pe-troleum products, radiotelephone transmitting devices, medicines, and cars. As oil and gas are among Kazakhstan's main exports, the country's trade balance depend on is affected by global commodity prices. Kazakh exports rose to a four-year high of USD 60.96 billion in 2018 from USD 48.3 billion a year earlier. Imports grew at a slower rate, edging up to USD 32.53 billion from USD 29.27 billion a year earlier. Thus, the 2018 trade surplus amounts to USD 25.5 billion. The imports of services were equal to USD 11.7 billion and the exports to USD 7.2 billion, therefore the overall trade balance for 2018 was USD 20.9 billion. [7]Peyrouse (2018) concluded that the Chinese and Kazakh economies are, however, proving to be complementary to a large degree. More than 80 percent of Chinas exports to Kazakhstan are finished consumer items (textiles, shoes, appliances, toys, electronics, spare parts, phar-maceutical products, foodstuffs), while 85 percent of Kazakhstans exports to China consist of raw materials (petroleum, ferrous and non-ferrous metals). China has brought Kazakhstan new technologies and modern financial and banking structures that can provide a framework for the countrys development and its entry on the world stage. The rapidly growing tele-communications sector is of particular interest to Chinese companies. The improvement of bilateral relations between China and Kazakhstan underscores these developments and might, in the short term, help consolidate the achievements of the largest Central Asian republic. Chinese and Kazakh officials have met to discuss economic, political, cultural and security issues. In June, Hu Jintao and Nazarbayev talked about the details of the security partnership agreed upon in 2005 and signed an agreement for the Development of an all-round Strategic Partnership, which includes a commitment to boost bilateral trade and increase meetings between high-ranking officials. Now the situation of Kazakh-Chinese relations could not look better: Nazarbayev and Hu Jintao seem to have a deep mutual understanding and the current Kazakh temporary presidency of the SCO will provide additional opportunities for the two presidents to meet and discuss aspects of bilateral cooperation. Chinese officials have ex-pressed satisfaction for the current situation of trade relations and have praised the recent creation of a trade and business center in Khorgos, at the border between Kazakhstan and China.China-Kazakh trade and economic cooperation has huge and untapped potential. Ka-zakh and Chinese officials have excellent reasons for being satisfied about the trade relations, which have reached a volume of $20 billion in 2011 (up from just $8.3 billion in 2006). The initial goal set by Kazakh and Chinese officials was to reach a trade volume of $15 billion by 2015, however this goal has been surpassed four years early as the value of bilateral trade is already $5 billion above the planned level.[1]The research focused on how Kazakhstan benefits from trade with China. Altynsarina (2019) argued that China is one of Kazakhstans largest foreign trade partners. It accounts for 15.7 percent of our total trade turnover. China has invested roughly $20 billion in joint projects and currently ranks fourth in terms of foreign direct investment in the Ka-zakh economy and this investment cooperation will only expand. This is especially important for Kazakhstan, which is diversifying its economy. It is well known that the global economy is experiencing uncertainty; investment opportunities have narrowed significantly in interna-tional financial markets. In this situation, investment cooperation with China is a great oppor-tunity for Kazakhstan to attract capital, technology and to continue the economic growth of our country. [4]O'Neill (2014) claimed in his article that China provides not only revenues for the Kazakh government, including foreign aid and loans, but also rents for those in position to capture them. Co-ownership by the Kazakh state-owned oil company, KazMunaiGas, of many major Chinese investments in the petroleum sector provide additional resources. [6]Same as Morrison (2014) mentioned that expanding on the literature explaining how oil rev-enues help leaders to maintain power, shows that increases in non-tax revenues, including foreign aid, foreign borrowing and income generated by state-owned enterprises, lead to greater stability in both democracies and autocracies. He suggests that state ownership of oil companies may be the key factor linking oil resource income and regime stability. Thus, Chinese willingness both to allow the Kazakh state oil company a majority share of Chinese investments in Kazakh oil and gas and to fund the purchase of this Kazakh share in some cas-es, is in China's self-interest; it enhances political stability in Kazakhstan. Stability is im-portant for all foreign investors, but it is specifically the maintenance of the current political system that protects Chinese investments. [6]Li Sun (2020) talked about Features of the trade between Kazakhstan and China were as fol-lows: Increase in export and decline in import with enlarged favorable balance of trade with China. In the first half of the year, the total value of bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and China amounted to 11.026 billion US dollars, exports of Kazakhstan to China amounted to 4.334 billion US dollars. Growth of trade between Kazakhstan and China was mostly at-tributed to exports by Kazakhstan to China. Export of petroleum and gas condensate exported by Kazakhstan to China in the first half of the year with a value of export increasing almost twice. Both export volume and export value of the following commodities increased: un-wrought refined copper and copper alloy, iron alloy, iron ore and copper ore. [8]Richardson (2014) concluded in her book on China's Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, writes: Some argue that China's aid gives it particularly good access to countries with ener-gy resources, yet little persuasive work has been done to suggest that without the aid packag-es China would be denied such benefits (p. 3) that advantages Chinese state-owned enter-prises over other states multinational enterprises. First, the sheer amount of funding that Chinese firms and their government backers can offer foreign governments is greater even than that which the world's largest private firms can offer. Second, the fact that Chinese SOEs are not solely motivated by profits but also by the goal of securing resources for China, means that Chinese SOEs can outbid private firms. This also means they may have longer time horizons than private firms. These longer time horizons mean Chinese firms can focus more on long-term aims than short-term profits. Third, because continued Chinese invest-ments and aid are in the interest of the Kazakh leadership, it is in their interest to protect Chinese investments from lower-level corruption and adverse policy changes. In addition, agreements for major investments by Chinese SOEs in Kazakhstan are made by the top lead-ers of both countries. As Chinese firms are state owned and supported by the top leaders of the Chinese government, agreements with Chinese SOEs become, in simple theory terms. This iteration promotes cooperation between the two sides and makes defection by the Ka-zakh leadership. [6]The research focused on difficulties in deepening economic and trade cooperation be-tween China and Kazakhstan.Boyd-Barrett (2011) says that the main problem for Kazakhstan's economy is the low level of diversification and the dependence on oil and gas exports. Chinese investments in non-resource sectors may be just what the country needs to overcome the obstacles to its devel-opment and avoid the middle income trap and the consequences of hydrocarbon prices fluctuation. Economic analysts both from China and the West have been warning for many years about the risks related to overheating of the Chinese economy. Amboise Evans-Pritchard has repeatedly underlined, often in a quite over-pessimistic way, the problems that China may face in a not too far future. Even Shaun Rein, sometimes considered as one of the most vocal advocates of China's achievements, has warned about some problems, such as the risk of bubbles in China's dot-com sector, high inflation rate, housing problems and US-Chinese trade tensions. More worrying signals of overheating have been identified by Bloombeg's analysts and by the World Economic Forum in 2010. Even though a hard land-ing is now considered unlikely, this risk cannot be ruled out completely. Kazakhstan's econ-omy is set to rely more and more on China's money, cooperation, investments, and energy imports, which exposes the Central Asian country to the risk of dependence on one single partner, and on its economic fortunes or misfortunes. This would mean replacing the reliance on hydrocarbons exports with another form of dependence. Oddly enough, this danger may be avoided because of the notorious wariness of authoritarian regimes for cooperation: Kazakh-stan's leadership is still to some extent cautious about China's intentions and is therefore un-willing to allow its powerful neighbor to unleash its full potential in Kazakhstan. Besides the risk of dependence on China, there is also another problem for Kazakhstan: if, on the one hand, Chinese investments and cheap goods are generally much welcomed both by the Cen-tral Asian governments and by the local population, the same cannot be said about Chinese emigration, temporary or permanent. [9]Myrzakhmetova (2014) mentioned that the main problem is which grade mutual trade and economic relations are beneficial for both sides. The main hypothesis was that they are high-ly beneficial because of complimentary interests of countries directed to each other. [10]Li Nan (2008) concluded that the economic development and the distribution of infrastruc-ture in the countries is not balanced, which are hard to meet the requirements of economic and trade cooperation. The first problem is that the bilateral trade potential remains to be ex-ploited. In this respect, it is important to expand the bilateral trade scale and keep enhancing the economic and trade relation. Increasing energy demand can be well satisfied with the rich natural resources, especially oil and gas and mineral resources in Kazakhstan. This lays a sol-id foundation for the bilateral energy trade cooperation.The second problem is that the trade structure between the two countries is unreasonable. The commodities traded between the two sides are mainly resource-intensive and labor-intensive products, while the proportion of capital-intensive and technology-intensive products is relatively low and trade in service de-veloping very slowly, thus the trade structure requires immediate improvement. [1]References:[1]Sbastien Peyrouse , Li Nan in Chinese Economic Presence in Kazakhstan China's Resolve and Central Asia's Apprehension (2008) .[2] Michael Clark, He Ping in Kazakh Responses to the Rise of China: Between Elite Bandwagoning and Societal Ambivalence (2014) p. 141- 142.[3]Dr Vladimir Paramonov in China Central Asia: Present Future of Economic Relations (2005) p. 3-5.[4] Elya Altynsarina in The Astana Times Kazakhstan and China: strengthening friendship and partnership in a new era 2019 p. 1.[5] Tatiyana Kudrenok in Kazinform Kazakhstan and China: a new milestone in mutually beneficial cooperation 2019 (9) p.1 - 3. [6] Daniel C.O'Neill, Morrison, Richardson in Risky business: The political economy of Chinese investment in Kazakhstan Journal of Eurasian Studies 2014, p. 145-156.[7] Morduch in Foreign trade figures of Kazakhstan 2016 p. 1.[8]Gelvig Svetlana, Sun Li in main features of China Kazakhstan economic integration 2020 (3)p. 35 - 40.[9] Boyd-Barrett in Globalization Kazakhstan and China 2011 p. 1-3.[10] A. Myrzakhmetova in Regulatory and procedural barriers to trade in Kazakhstan, 2014 p.22-30.[11] Dmitry Babich in The Astana Times Kazakhstans Independence Day: 29 Years Ago the Worlds Countries Have Got a New Big Friend 2020 p.1.[12] Nurmukhambet B. in BULLETIN of Ablai Khan KazUIRandWL (Kazakh-Chinese relations in security)2018.[13] Marlene Laruelle in Chinas Belt and and Road initiaveand its impact in Central Asia 2018.[14] Wu Jiao, Zhang Yunbi in China Daily New Silk Road' with Central Asia 2013.[15] Denis Sinor in Brittanica Independent Kazakhstan 2014 p. 5-14.
2. 研究的基本内容、问题解决措施及方案
研究的内容：Through the summary of the above literature, we can find that many scholars and experts have done a lot of research on the bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and China. However, few papers were able to address the fact that a large influx of cheap goods will also be imported into Kazakhstan along with Chinas multimillion dollar investments. Besides, the existing research mentioned above have not paid enough attention to the impact of Sino-Kazakhstan trade on small businesses in Kazakhstan. Layout of the thesisBased on the above analysis, the thesis will be analyzed in the following sequence. In Chapter one, I will introduce the research focused on the history of Sino-Kazakhstan Trade. Chapter two will focus on advantages and major exports of Kazakhstan and China in bilateral trade. Chapter three will focus on how Kazakhstan benefits from trade with China. In Chapter four, I will focus on difficulties in deepening economic and trade cooperation between China and Kazakhstan.拟采用研究方法： The basis of the study was: the international relations, concepts, and scenarios of the development of good-neighborly, progressive relations between China and Kazakhstan. In the process of research, scientific methods of systemic, statistical, and comparative analysis will be used.
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